Mangione, Act II: The Legal Arsenal as a Bludgeon

Exploring the weaponization of justice: How law becomes an instrument of power

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This series offers a multidimensional analysis of the Luigi Mangione case, examining it from mediatic, legal, political, and cultural angles. Each part delves into a different aspect, uncovering the forces shaping the narrative and public perception around him.

• Mangione, Act I: The Price He Pays for Entertaining Us

• Mangione, Act II: The Legal Arsenal as a Bludgeon

• Mangione, Act III: The Politics of Guilt

• Mangione, Act IV: The Architecture of Support

• Mangione, Epilogue: The Rift Before the Trial

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Before proceeding, please be mindful that this is an analysis based on the facts as they were presented to the public. We will not make judgments about guilt or innocence, only assess the law as it stands, its applicability in this case, and whether the charges align with the alleged acts.

The judicial process of Luigi Mangione has become a battleground where legal decisions and political strategies converge. But when did the courtroom morph into a political arena? And whom does this convergence truly serve? Beyond the nature of the act, classified as a violent crime, the accumulation of charges and the addition of terrorism offenses, along with the involvement of high-ranking officials, suggest a strategy that seeks to reinforce political narratives and safeguard entrenched interests. And the role of the media that works hand in hand.

It is important to note that the media narrative—its tendency to twist, dramatize and oversimplify facts—has already been thoroughly addressed in a previous article. While the case has captured public attention and shaped opinions, this analysis will focus on the legal and political instrumentalization of the case.

As pointed out by his attorney, Karen F. Agnifilo, after the February 21 hearing, Luigi Mangione is being prosecuted three times for a single event— he is facing a grand jury indictment on 11 counts in New York, including a first-degree murder charge, for the alleged killing of the UHC CEO. He is also facing additional charges filed by the state of Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the federal government has yet to formally present its indictment, with a deadline set for March 19. If federal prosecutors decide to move forward, they could seek the death penalty—a possibility that, according to his defense team, places additional strain on both the legal process and Mangione’s ability to receive fair treatment in state proceedings.

The sheer number of charges in this case is unprecedented. With a total of 20 charges, one must ask: Whether this is a quest for justice or a bureaucratic bludgeoning.

This strategy has two key purposes. First, to create a legal net so broad that if one charge fails, another will likely hold—effectively creating a legal overkill designed to ensure conviction and to send a clear, unforgiving message of ‘zero tolerance’. Second, to amplify perceived severity by invoking terrorism. In this regard, it is also worth noting that classifying the crime as terrorism is a specific requirement of the State of New York in order to apply the first-degree murder charge.

But how can a single homicide be labeled terrorism? The answer lies in the interests the law protects. Under U.S. law, terrorism involves ‘to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion’. According to the criminal complaint filed by the FBI, among the evidence found at the time of the suspect's arrest was a notebook containing the letter ‘to the feds’ and ‘several handwritten pages that express hostility towards the health insurance industry and wealthy executives in particular’. However, before any conclusions can be drawn, the authenticity of these documents, and the link between them and the suspect must be firmly established. Even if this connection is confirmed, the terrorism element must be examined. Prima facie, there is a lack of direct threats to the civilian population, explicit ideological declarations, or a deliberate effort to influence government policy.

It is crucial to note that we refer to it as a letter 'to the feds' because labeling it a manifesto is a deliberate strategy that carries significant implications. By doing so, the state reinforces its narrative of terrorism and frames the content as a public declaration, thereby elevating the perceived threat and the stakes involved. Yet, by framing him as a public enemy, the state has elevated this case beyond a mere criminal act, turning it into a broader political statement—one that reinforces a warning to those who challenge power structures.

State officials may defend their decision to charge Luigi Mangione with terrorism as a necessary bulwark against domestic extremism. Their reasoning leans on post-9/11 legal doctrines that expanded the definition of terrorism to include lone actors whose ideological fervor—even absent formal ties to extremist groups—could theoretically justify preemptive prosecution.

A Mangione supporter outside Manhattan criminal court, February 21st, 2025.

But does this logic hold up in Mangione’s case? Take again the FBI’s evidence: a personal notebook. Missing are the hallmarks of terrorism—calls for mass violence, blueprints for coercion, or manifestos seeking ideological recruits. Contrast this with United States v. Robert Doggart (2017), where a militia leader’s plan to burn mosques and murder Muslim residents in New York included GPS coordinates of targets and procurement orders for assault rifles. Doggart’s terrorism was marked by blood and gunpowder; Mangione’s alleged ‘terrorism’ has been claimed to have been traced in ink and discontent.

In reality, the state’s use of ‘national security’ seems less about neutralizing danger than silencing dissent. When the law becomes a weapon to pathologize criticism, justice risks reflecting the very oppression it seeks to combat.

Beyond the overblown charges lies a more troubling issue, perhaps the one most widely known and discussed: the erosion of Mangione’s right to a fair trial—a cornerstone of justice now crumbling under political pressure.

The Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial to a defendant in a criminal prosecution. It states that the defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial, has the right to legal representation and to be informed of the ‘nature and cause of the accusation’, which includes the right to know the evidence against oneself.

Further, the Fifth Amendment—a precursor to the above-mentioned right— guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life and liberty without the due process of law. It is worth noting that the right to a fair trial is embedded within due process protections, with specific elements like compulsory process (the right to obtain witnesses) being a critical part of that fairness. The Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution further extends the application of these safeguards to the state level, a process known as ‘incorporation’.

The New York Criminal Procedure Law also provides the accused with the right to due process and a fair trial. CPL § 245 details the requirements for discovery in a criminal trial. It sets the framework for the exchange of information between the prosecution and the defense, helping to ensure fairness in criminal trials. It binds the prosecution to disclose statements, documentary and physical evidence. Crucially, any exculpatory evidence must also be disclosed by the prosecution. This means any evidence that might help the defendant’s case. This is part of the prosecutor's duty under Brady v. Maryland, a 1963 US Supreme Court decision.

In Brady v. Maryland, the US Supreme Court had held, with a 7-2 majority, that the suppression of evidence by the prosecution that is favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it undermines the defendant’s right to a fair trial. It held that evidence that could exonerate the defendant or reduce their sentence must be disclosed by the prosecution, regardless of whether the defense specifically requests it. It is the prosecution's responsibility to ensure that all evidence that could aid the defense is provided.

It is important to note that the suppressed evidence must be material to the case, that is, it should have a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the trial. If the evidence could potentially lead to a different verdict or a reduced sentence, it is covered under the Brady rule. Failure to disclose materially favorable evidence can result in the reversal of a conviction, a new trial, or other remedies. It could be argued that the prosecution acts for public safety, particularly in high-profile cases involving terrorism charges. However, the lack of transparency in Mangione’s case—evidenced by withheld police reports and delayed discovery—gives rise to skepticism about whether these supposed public safety concerns truly outweigh the defendant’s constitutional rights.

The Brady rule has been significantly expanded by subsequent decisions: In 1972, in Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that it would include impeachment evidence (i.e. such evidence which can impeach the credibility of government witnesses) even if it does not exonerate the defendant. In Kyles v. Whitley (1995) the Court decided that the prosecution had a duty to actively seek exculpatory evidence in the possession of law enforcement or any other government agencies, and not just disclose the evidence in its possession. In this case, the evidence that had not been disclosed included police reports that could have potentially exonerated the defendant or cast doubt on his guilt. Lastly, in Banks v. Dretke (2004) the court overturned Banks’ death sentence as exculpatory evidence material to the verdict was not disclosed by the prosecution, and also stated that it was not the defense’s burden to uncover such violations.

Under CPL § 245.10, the prosecution must make the required disclosures within approximately two weeks after the defendant’s arraignment, unless the defendant waives this time limit or the court orders an extension. The prosecution is also obligated to promptly supplement the disclosure if new evidence or information arises. If either party fails to comply with the two-week deadline to complete discovery, the court has the power to impose sanctions (such as excluding evidence that was not properly disclosed), draw adverse inferences against the non-compliant party, or impose penalties. It is noteworthy that in extreme cases, the court may also order dismissal of charges if the failure to disclose evidence significantly impacts the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial.

Lastly, the defendant should not be physically restrained unless there are “substantial reasons” for it (such as the defendant’s behavior or risk of escape) or it could violate the right to a fair hearing. In Deck v. Missouri (2005), the US Supreme Court ruled that shackling a defendant in front of the jury without any specific justification violates due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. It is also necessary for the court to state on record why such restraints are required, as reiterated in People v. Best (2012) by the New York Court of Appeals. These protections, however, ring hollow when the state’s case is built on foundational abuses that occur long before and out of the courtroom—abuses such as Mangione’s unconstitutional detention in Pennsylvania, which prosecutors could later attempt to justify as a Terry stop despite its glaring irregularities.

On December 9, 2024, Altoona police cornered Mangione at a McDonald’s, alleging he 'looked suspicious' after he overstayed his welcome by 30 minutes as a customer, which seems to be the only reason the cops repeatedly cited to justify their suspicion. Officers blocked exits, retained his ID, and interrogated him without Miranda warnings, all while rifling through his backpack in a search that far exceeded what even a lawful Terry stop would permit under Terry v. Ohio (1968). Should prosecutors argue this encounter was a valid investigative detention, the defense is poised to dismantle such a claim: Terry requires ‘specific, objective facts’ of criminality, not hunches or ‘unparticularized suspicion’, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Brown v. Texas (1979). Mangione’s presence as a customer meets neither standard.

Mangione at the McDonald's in Altoona on the day of his arrest, December 9th, 2024

The search itself—opening sealed packages with a knife, as shown in the omnibus motion filed by Mangione’s attorney Tom Dickey and seizing items without probable cause—violates the Fourth Amendment, which limits Terry Frisks to detecting weapons. Furthermore, the detention’s duration,and restraints, including 10+ officers blocking exits and prolonged interrogation, transformed it into a de facto arrest, a tactic the Supreme Court condemned in Florida v. Royer (1983). If prosecutors later invoke Terry to legitimize this encounter, they will face an insurmountable hurdle: the detention was custodial and required Miranda warnings—which were only given 17 minutes later, during which they claimed he was ‘not under custody’.

The prosecution may seek to justify the admission of illegally obtained evidence by invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine, which permits the use of unlawfully obtained evidence if it would have been found through legal means. Established in Nix v. Williams (1984), this doctrine requires the prosecution to prove that law enforcement was actively pursuing a legal avenue that would have led to the same discovery, making the illegal search unnecessary. However, in Mangione’s case, there was no independent investigation in motion in Altoona that could have led to such evidence. In fact, it remains debatable whether there was any incriminating evidence on his person to be ‘discovered’ in the first place. A similar argument was upheld in United States v. Vasquez De Reyes (1998), where the Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s attempt to apply the doctrine, ruling that the mere possibility of discovering evidence is insufficient—there must be a concrete, lawful process already underway.

Furthermore, no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Mangione’s belongings. Law enforcement had full control over the scene, with over ten officers surrounding him, blocking all exits, and confiscating his backpack. This eliminates any claim that immediate action was necessary to prevent escape or evidence destruction. Even if such urgency had existed before his arrest, it would have ceased the moment he was taken into custody, rendering the search illegal under Payton v. New York (1980). The circumstances surrounding his detention and search—marked by procedural irregularities and the broader political implications of the case—raise serious concerns about bad faith on the part of law enforcement. Rather than following legal procedures, the handling of his arrest suggests an intent to bypass constitutional safeguards, reinforcing the argument that the search and seizure of his belongings were unlawful.

The prosecution’s failure to disclose police reports from this encounter—potentially numbering in the hundreds—echoes their broader disregard for due process, mirroring the Brady violations already undermining Mangione’s defense. If the evidence is suppressed under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine (Wong Sun v. United States, 1963), the firearms and notebook could vanish, exposing the fragility of the prosecution’s “overkill” strategy. The omnibus motion forces a reckoning: either the judiciary upholds foundational rights, or it tacitly endorses a system where dissent is criminalized through procedural abuse.

The timing is pivotal. With the federal indictment deadline looming on March 19, the motion amplifies pressure on prosecutors to justify their claims—or risk unraveling them. As legal scholar Garland Fox noted, “When the state’s case relies on poisoned fruit, even a single suppressed search can topple an empire of charges.” For Mangione, this motion is more than a procedural step; it is a litmus test for whether courts remain bastions of due process or capitulate to the theatrics of fear.

Finally, this interplay of factors not only redefines Mangione's case but also sets a troubling precedent for how justice can be manipulated to serve the shifting political needs of the moment. The second part of this analysis will delve into how the theatricalization of the judicial process and the interventions of key political figures are shaping the narrative of this case, raising serious questions about the integrity of our legal system.

For a deeper understanding of the laws, you can also read these two posts as a complement: Why The Neutrality of Law Remains a Myth and When Law and Morality Meet—and Collide.